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Abstract 
Much has been written on the subject of cyber security over the past 
two decades, but there remain significant shortcomings in the litera-
ture. Cyber security is a field filled with fundamental conceptual, the-
oretical and empirical disagreements, making any systematic analysis 
of cyberspace difficult. This paper seeks to categorize the various ap-
proaches, here referred to as schools of thought, to cyber security and 
identify the sources of their disagreements. Much of the academic and 
policy debate has revolved around the “revolutionist” and “traditional-
ist” schools of thought, with debates over cyberwar and the efficacy of 
strategic information warfare. However, none of the schools offer a 
systematic approach to understanding the strategic utility of cyber-
space. This paper identifies a third, less known approach that is best 
described as “environmentalist.” The “environmentalist” school’s ap-
proach to cyber power and analysis of cyberspace as a distinct envi-
ronment or system offers the best way forward for the field.  
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Introduction 
Since the rise of cyber security as a prominent policy issue in the early 
1990s, the overarching question has been: “What is the role of cyber 
security in international relations?” Government officials, policymak-
ers, and academics have tried to define the utility of cyberspace as 
both a weapon and an arena for conflict. This question is two-fold: 
how can “we” use cyberspace to our advantage? and how can “our” 
opponents use cyberspace to their advantage?  
 
In essence, the object of analysis is power: cyber power. However, 
answers to these questions are clouded by significant uncertainty 
around the nature of information technology, how it will be used in 
society in the future, and how actors can leverage the technology and 
its accompanying vulnerabilities to achieve political goals. The result 
of this uncertainty, fueled by a lack of empirical data, is that there is 
little common understanding of the conceptual and theoretical nature 
of cyberspace as it relates to security.1 There is a growing body of 
scholarly work dedicated to cyber security, but much of it has been 
policy-oriented, overly technical, or both. The remainder of the field is 
characterized by differing approaches and competing views on con-
cepts as well as empirics—none offering any systematic and compre-
hensive understanding of cyberspace as a tool of power. 
 
This paper discusses the various schools of thought on cyber security 
and what they offer for understanding cyber power. The main conflict 
lies between what in this paper are classifies as the Revolutionist and 
Traditionalist schools of cyber security. Adherents of these schools 
differ strongly on how information communications technology (ICT) 
may change conflict, and what kinds of actions are both possible and 
plausible through cyberspace. Briefly put, the Revolutionists hold an 
expansive view of the impact of ICT, claiming that it can change the 
character, if not the nature, of warfare. Traditionalists, by contrast, are 
skeptical to these claims, with some saying that the prospects of ex-
tensive cyber conflict have been exaggerated. These two schools do 
not share a common conceptual idea of cyberspace and cyber conflict, 
making it difficult to synthesize some kind of overarching theory. 
What this paper aims to do is to identify the core ideas represented in 
these competing views, illustrate the conflict in conceptual and empir-
ical terms, and offer a more productive way forward for the field. That 
                                                 
1  For various reasons, there are simply not enough data available for testing hypotheses 
adequately. Many CNOs are not disclosed or adequately measured in terms of origins and 
motives, and government capabilities and vulnerabilities are generally kept classified. 
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suggested framework draws on a third approach: the Environmental 
school. The primary objective of the texts that comprise the Environ-
mental school of cyber security is to address cyber power, either im-
plicitly or explicitly. By analyzing cyberspace as a distinct environ-
ment, they go beyond purely military or state-centric analysis, and of-
fer a more comprehensive way of approaching cyber security than the 
two other schools. However, the Environmental school has not yet of-
fered a systematic framework of analysis, so this paper will synthesize 
the various texts and define theory gaps that need to be filled. 
 
While the primary aim of this working paper is to bring clarity to an 
academic debate, there are also implications for the ongoing debate 
about cyber policy. Much of the Traditionalist literature has in fact 
attempted to link theory with practice, though it has some shortcom-
ings that will be discussed later on in the paper. Scholars like Thomas 
Rid have criticized the theoretical and conceptual underpinnings of the 
Revolutionists by examining what is practically possible in cyber-
space. Rid argues that extensive cyber warfare is unlikely to occur, 
given the nature of cyberspace and cyber weapons, and that cyber-
space is more suited for other kinds of military operations, like espio-
nage, sabotage and subversion.2 This is an issue of direct policy rele-
vance because it concerns how states can utilize the digital environ-
ment to pursue political objectives. 
 
This paper begins by examining the oldest school of cyber security, 
the Revolutionist school, based largely on texts written in the infancy 
of the information revolution. To illustrate the core ideas of this 
school, I present some selected central texts, showing how these ideas 
have influenced current thinking on cyber policy,  the potential for 
cyberwar in particular. The next section presents the Traditionalist 
school. This school is largely defined by its function as a corrective to 
the more expansive claims of the Revolutionists, so many of its core 
texts and ideas have been written in response to Revolutionist think-
ing. As that debate is still ongoing, this section will also cover texts 
that criticize the Traditionalist approach. These critiques usually at-
tempt to find a middle way between the two schools, without offering 
an inherently new approach to the study of cyber security. However, 
as we will see, the third school does offer that new approach. What 
can best be described as the Environmentalist school has not played a 
prominent part in the academic debate, but it offers the best potential 
for a systematic framework of analysis for cyber security. However, it 
is an incomplete approach, so this section will synthesize its various 
texts and suggest possible ways forward. The final section of this 
working paper summarizes the findings of the literature review and 
                                                 
2  Thomas Rid, “Cyber War Will Not Take Place,” Journal of Strategic Studies 35, no. 1 
(2012): 5–32. 
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7 
discusses what ideas and concepts from the three schools can be in-
cluded in a more systematic framework. I also suggest some agendas 
for future research, and discuss how possible changes in the technolo-
gy and in its use might affect the ideas presented. 
 
 The Revolutionists 
The Revolutionist school of cyber security is represented by a wide 
range of texts. As several of these were written in the formative years 
of the information revolution, they have to a certain extent defined 
how cyber security is understood today.3 It is therefore important to 
consider the historical roots of this field. As we will see, the Revolu-
tionist school includes two overlapping approaches to cyber security. 
The first, and oldest, is traditional in its approach, as it focuses on mil-
itary-to-military operations and either kinetic effects or disruptive ef-
fects similar to electronic warfare. While this approach was maturing 
in places like the Pentagon, a second approach surfaced, one that was 
more holistic in examining the potential marriage of technology and 
organization. Whereas the two approaches may differ as to the subject 
of analysis (military versus societal structures) and purpose (empirical 
analysis versus conceptual development), both seek to identify the po-
tential for cyber warfare in a strategic context. Moreover, the entire 
school of Revolutionist thinking is marked by an expansive, optimistic 
view of the role of technology in conflict—with some even claiming 
that new technology will change the very nature of war. 
 
The idea of waging war against and through computer systems is 
nothing new. Even though most of the literature on cyber warfare has 
appeared in the past two decades, the vulnerabilities associated with 
                                                 
3  The following texts are considered to be part of the revolutionist school. Some texts over-
lap with other schools, while some authors listed here, such as Martin C. Libicki and 
Gregory J. Rattray, moved on to other approaches with their later works. See: Thomas P. 
Rona, “Weapon Systems and Information War” (Office of the Secretary of Defense, July 
1, 1976); Martin C. Libicki, The Mesh and the Net: Speculations on Armed Conflict in a 
Time of Free Silicon (Washington, DC: National Defense University, March 1994), 
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA278484&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf; Roger C. Mo-
lander, Andrew Riddile, and Peter A. Wilson, Strategic Information Warfare: A New 
Face of War (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1996), 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR661.html; John Arquilla and David 
Ronfeldt, The Advent of Netwar (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1996), 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR789.html; George J. Stein, Information 
Attack: Information Warfare In 2025 (Montgomery, AL: U.S. Air War College, August 
1996); John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, eds., In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict 
in the Information Age (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1997); Buard Q. Clem-
mons and Gary D. Brown, “Cyberwarfare: Ways, Warriors and Weapons of Mass De-
struction,” Military Review 79, no. 5 (October 1999): 35–45; Gregory J. Rattray, Strategic 
Warfare in Cyberspace (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001); Colin S. Gray, Another 
Bloody Century: Future Warfare (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005); Phillip S. 
Meilinger, “The Mutable Nature of War,” Air & Space Power Journal 24, no. 4 (2010): 
24–30; Andrew F. Krepinevich, Cyber Warfare: A “Nuclear Option”? (Washington, DC: 
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, August 24, 2012), 
http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2012/08/cyber-warfare-a-nuclear-option/; John 
Stone, “Cyber War Will Take Place!,” Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no. 1 (2013): 101–
108. 
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widespread ICT integration were being discussed well before the 
spread of the Internet and the personal computer. In 1976, defense an-
alyst Thomas P. Rona coined the term “information warfare” in a re-
port on the potential vulnerabilities of US weapons platforms that had 
become reliant on computer systems.4 I f someone could manipulate 
or disrupt the processes controlling these platforms, Rona noted, that 
actor could keep the weapons from receiving launch commands. That 
would have implications for defense as well as offense: the United 
States could be the target of such operations, but could also exploit 
similar vulnerabilities in Soviet systems.5 As the Cold War persisted, 
Pentagon analysts continued working on the concept of information 
warfare throughout the 1980s.6 
 
Although the Soviet Union dissolved, fears of ICT-associated vulner-
abilities did not recede. In the 1990s information warfare was being 
discussed in a strategic context. A 1996 RAND report described the 
concept of Strategic Information Warfare (SIW). It was primarily 
military in nature, and the report argued that the United States and a 
range of other countries had grown so dependent on ICT that comput-
er network attacks (CNA) against these networks could have strategic 
effect.7 Cyber warfare was thus elevated, at least conceptually, to the 
same level as other forms of strategic warfare. Cyber power was then 
(and still is) compared to strategic air power, but other authors have 
also characterized cyber tools as potential, albeit indirect, weapons of 
mass destruction.8 
 
Published a few years later, Gregory J. Rattray’s Strategic Warfare in 
Cyberspace is arguably the most influential book on SIW.9 Rattray 
draws several parallels between the rise of strategic air power in the 
1930s and 1940s and the possible use of cyberspace as an arena for 
strategic warfare, a concept that he calls “Strategic Information War-
fare” (SIW).10 Rattray rejects “the assumption that strategic infor-
mation warfare should be treated as a completely new phenomenon 
because of the ‘virtual’ or nonphysical nature of operating in the cy-
berspace environment,” because “[c]yberspace is…actually a physical 
                                                 
4  The concept of information warfare, as used by Rona, is more or less identical with the 
concept of cyber warfare, meaning the aggressive use of computer network operations to 
disrupt, degrade or destroy an opponent’s networks. 
5  Rona, “Weapon Systems and Information War.” 
6  Bruce D. Berkowitz, The New Face of War: How War Will Be Fought in the 21st Century 
(New York, NY: Free Press, 2003), chap. 4. 
7  Molander, Riddile, and Wilson, Strategic Information Warfare: A New Face of War. 
8    Clemmons and Brown, “Cyberwarfare: Ways, Warriors and Weapons of Mass Destruc-
tion.” 
9  Rattray, Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace. 
10  Technically, Rattray’s comparativist approach falls under the Environmentalist school, 
but will be used here to illustrate thinking on SIW. Further discussion of the merits of the 
comparitivist approach is presented in section on the Environmentalist school. 
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domain resulting from the creation of information systems and net-
works that enable electronic interactions to take place.”11  
 
As regards digital warfare, Rattray distinguishes between three types 
of attacks: mechanical, electromagnetic and digital. He describes the 
first as attacks on physical infrastructure; the second type involves the 
use of electromagnetic pulse and jammers to disrupt or destroy elec-
tronic components and transmissions. Neither of these two is directly 
relevant to our discussion here, but the third one is directly applicable. 
Digital attacks may come in a wide range of forms, and include net-
work-based attacks on other networks—computer network operations 
(CNO).12 
 
According to Rattray, SIW can be conducted in either a physically vi-
olent or a nonviolent way. Even if a digital attack does not cause dam-
age or shed blood, that does not mean it does not constitute a use of 
force. In fact, Rattray argues, “the achievement of political objectives 
may not require the actual use of violent means. The use of non-
violent digital attacks to achieve political objectives must be under-
stood as part of a new form of warfare.”13 He refers to digital warfare 
as a type of microforce that can cause significant amounts of damage, 
despite the low level of energy expended:14 
 
Compared to other types of military force, digital warfare represents a type of 
microforce. The distinction is analogous to the difference drawn between con-
ventional military forces employing chemical explosives or kinetic energy as 
their primary means of achieving effect versus the megaforce unleashed by nu-
clear weapons based on the fission or fusion of atoms. At issue here is the 
amount of energy unleashed by a given weapon at the time of attack. Weapons 
across the micro-conventional-mega force spectrum can all cause very signifi-
cant impacts. Chemical or biological weapons are referred to as weapons of 
mass destruction, not because of the amount of destructive energy released when 
they are deployed but because of the number of deaths they can cause. Large-
scale conventional use of force, such as the bombings of Tokyo and Dresden in 
World War II, has caused massive damage. Despite the microforce nature of in-
formation attacks, disruption of the digital control systems of a nuclear power 
plant could cause similarly large-scale effects.15 (emphasis added) 
 
Using nuclear power plants as an example is reductive and the focus 
on deaths belies Rattray’s previous point on nonviolent use of force, 
but his observation that secondary effects of digital attacks can cause 
damage is important. Shutting down a network in and of itself is of 
minor importance; the potential for paralyzing economies or societal 
functions is of significant importance. The key point here is the poten-
                                                 
11  Rattray, Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace, 17. 
12  Rattray, Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace, 17–18. 
13  Ibid, 20. 
14  Ibid, 20. 
15  Ibid, 20. 
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tial for coercion and achieving political objectives; whether that hap-
pens through killing the population or inflicting serious economic or 
other nonmaterial damage is largely irrelevant. However, as Rattray 
himself admits, the “microforce potential of digital information war-
fare is as yet unclear.”16 
Information revolution 
While the concept of SIW depicted new types of military operations 
and targets, its focus on kinetic-like effects was largely traditional. 
Other scholars sought to reveal the broader implications of the infor-
mation revolution underway, including, but not limited to, computer 
network attacks. This came with the debate on cyber security in the 
1990s, when speculation about the potential for cyber power was de-
bated through the prism of the Revolution in Military Affairs 
(RMA).17 Together with the concept of SIW, much of Western think-
ing and the scholarship of recent years can be traced back to those ini-
tial texts.18 
 
At the forefront of this debate were John Arquilla and Don Ronfeldt, 
who wrote extensively about how the information revolution would 
revolutionize the way the military would wage war. This revolution 
would not be limited to new tools, the purely technological aspect, but 
would also encompass organizational changes enabling a more coor-
dinated and efficient military. In 1993, Arquilla and Ronfeldt indicat-
ed that, in the future, “warfare is no longer primarily a function of 
who puts the most capital, labor and technology on the battlefield, but 
of who has the best information about the battlefield.”19c They elabo-
rated on this concept, stressing that the information revolution had the 
potential to transform the way the military is organized and operates. 
We should keep in mind Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s expansive use of the 
concept of information warfare when examining their ideas. They do 
not use the term “information warfare,” but terms with the “cyber” 
prefix, with reference to its Greek root kybernan, meaning to steer or 
govern. Thus, the prefix implies a form of “control warfare” that en-
compasses control not only of one’s own organization but of the op-
ponent’s as well, through the control, use or manipulation of infor-
                                                 
16  Ibid, 22. 
17  Colin S. Gray distinguishes between an information RMA and a cyberwar RMA. See: 
Gray, Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare, 105. For a discussion of the intersection 
of information systems and organization in the military to enable greater, speed and preci-
sion, see William A. Owens, “The Emerging System of Systems,” Military Review 75, no. 
3 (June 1995): 15–19. 
18  Chinese and Russian schools of thinking on cyber security differ substantially from West-
ern thinking, but that is a topic beyond the scope of this paper. 
19  John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Cyberwar Is Coming!,” in In Athena’s Camp: Pre-
paring for Conflict in the Information Age, ed. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1997), 23. 
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mation.20 Arquilla and Ronfeldt then go on to create two distinct 
terms: netwar and cyberwar. The former is described thus: 
 
Netwar refers to information-related conflict at a grand level between nations or 
societies. It means trying to disrupt, damage, or modify what a target population 
“knows” or thinks it knows about itself and the world around it. A netwar may 
focus on public or elite opinion, or both. It may include public diplomacy 
measures, propaganda and psychological campaigns, political and cultural sub-
version, deception of or interference with local media, infiltration of computer 
networks and databases, and efforts to promote a dissident or opposition move-
ments across computer networks.21 
 
As these authors would later clarify, netwar is distinct from cyberwar 
by being “normally about low-intensity conflict (LIC) and operations 
other than war (OOTW—a broader concept than LIC that includes 
peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations).”22a Given both its 
form (asymmetrical, non-hierarchical, and probably non-violent) and 
function (societal change), netwar can be seen as a hypothetical con-
tinuation of traditional Kulturkampf. Thomas Rid and Marc Hecker 
have come up with a related concept, “War 2.0,” to describe the role 
of media operations and information technology in asymmetrical con-
flict. While it encompasses public affairs, psychological operations, 
public diplomacy and information operations, “War 2.0” should be 
seen as a subcategory of netwar.23 
 
In a military context, the aim of netwar is to manipulate the oppo-
nent’s decisionmaking processes. According to George J. Stein, by 
conducting information or computer network operations, the opponent 
may be positioned “in space and time, by his own decision, in a fatally 
disadvantageous strategic situation.” 24 Further: “Information attack is 
not so much perception management as orientation management. In-
formation is both the target and the weapon: the weapon effect is pre-
dictable error.”25 As such, command and control warfare and CNO are 
means to an end—technological tools used to achieve cognitive ef-
fects on the strategic level. 
                                                 
20  Arquilla and Ronfeldt, “Cyberwar Is Coming!,” 57–58, endnote 7. 
21  Ibid., 28. 
22  John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “The Advent of Netwar,” in In Athena’s Camp: Pre-
paring for Conflict in the Information Age, ed. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1997), 275. 
23  “Netwar” is a broader term meant to encompass whole societies, while “War 2.0” can 
simply mean one insurgent group, politically motivated, fighting government forces or 
forces intervening from the outside. “War 2.0” is a way of fighting war, but in an asym-
metrical setting. See Thomas Rid and Marc Hecker, War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the In-
formation Age (Westpost, Connecticut: Prager Security International, 2009). 
24  Stein’s use of key terms is somewhat confusing. He uses “netwar” as analogous to infor-
mation warfare, and places “cyberwar” as the operational level of information warfare, 
but his focus on military operations is perhaps more fitting of Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s 
“cyberwar” term. Stein, Information Attack: Information Warfare In 2025, iv. 
25  Ibid. 
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Let us now turn to Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s definition of cyberwar. In 
their 1993 article, it is defined broadly as encompassing organization, 
doctrine and technology: 
 
[C]onducting, and preparing to conduct, military operations according to infor-
mation-related principles. It means disrupting if not destroying the information 
and communications systems, broadly defined to include even military cul-
ture…It means trying to know all about an adversary while keeping it from 
knowing much about oneself. It means turning the “balance of information and 
knowledge in one’s favor, especially if the balance of forces is not. It means us-
ing knowledge so that less capital and labor may have to be expended.26 (empha-
sis added) 
 
The basic idea behind Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s concept, and thus its 
link to the RMA debate, is the translation of nonmaterial factors into 
material gains. How do “we” use information and information systems 
to defeat an opponent when we need to do this cheaply or have no 
other options, due to imbalance in resources? As the authors stress, 
cyberwar “should not be confused with past meanings of computer-
ized, automated, robotic, or electronic warfare.”27 To them, it is a 
broader concept that encompasses technology but also much more 
than that. The marriage of organization, doctrine, and technology can 
transform warfare, and even war itself. Information is the key here: 
how to obtain it, and how to use it. As Arquilla and Ronfeldt write, 
“[i]f information is a veritable physical property, then in the infor-
mation age winning wars may depend on being able to hurl the most 
information at the enemy, while safeguarding against retaliation.”28 
 
Though much of what they write is speculative, Arquilla and Ronfeldt 
draw on historical examples such as Blitzkrieg and Mongol warfare to 
show how the information revolution might further change warfare. 
One of their proposals is a doctrine based on swarming: “when the 
dispersed nodes of a network of small (and also perhaps some large) 
forces can converge on an enemy from multiple directions, through 
either fire or maneuver.” As they describe swarming, “[t]he overall 
aim should be sustainable pulsing—swarm networks must be able to 
coalesce rapidly and stealthily on a target, then dissever and redis-
perse, immediately ready to recombine for a new pulse.”29 
 
The material value of information is fundamental to the RMA think-
ing, and others have presented concepts stressing the informational 
                                                 
26  Arquilla and Ronfeldt, “Cyberwar Is Coming!,” 30. 
27  Arquilla and Ronfeldt, “Cyberwar Is Coming!,” 30. 
28  John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Information, Power, and Grand Strategy: In Athena’s 
Camp--Section 1,” in In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age, 
ed. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1997), 
158. 
29  John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Looking Ahead: Preparing for Information-Age Con-
flict,” in In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age, ed. John Ar-
quilla and David Ronfeldt (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1997), 465. 
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and organizational impact of cyberspace. Martin C. Libicki coined the 
term “Mesh” in a 1994 article to describe the use of information on 
the battlefield, and particularly the utility of extensive sensor net-
works. Mesh, according to Libicki, “points to the holes; as infor-
mation technology places a finer mesh atop the battlefield, more ob-
jects are caught in it.”30 The concept is based on the assumption that 
the United States will not fight a war against a peer rival, but instead 
fight against an opponent with underdeveloped informational capabili-
ties that seeks to “create as many casualties as possible in hopes that 
the United States would be dissuaded from further pursuit.”31 The 
Mesh strategy would then offer the United States the ability “to con-
trol the battlefield to the greatest possible extent so as to minimize ex-
posure and casualties.”32 As with swarming, the Mesh is facilitated by 
technology and is probably contingent on the information revolution. 
Computer networks and sensors enable, and illuminate, organizational 
and doctrinal change—but they remain a means to an end. 
Alarmism 
The group of scholars described above can be described as “revolu-
tionists.” This does not imply uniform agreement as to the mechanics 
of cyber conflict, but the two groups share a fundamental view on the 
implications of cyberspace in security—that the information revolu-
tion is, or has the potential for, changing warfare, and possibly war 
itself. This basic idea of a revolution in warfare has been adopted by 
many in the policy community, leading to what can only be described 
as hyperbolic predictions on the destructive potential of cyberspace.33 
While the object of this paper is not to analyze policy per se, the poli-
cy and discourse implications of revolutionist ideas have a direct bear-
ing on our discussion of the Traditionalist school, so a brief descrip-
tion is in order. 
                                                 
30  Libicki, The Mesh and the Net: Speculations on Armed Conflict in a Time of Free Silicon, 
3. 
31  Ibid, 24. 
32  Ibid, 24. 
33  For more on the issue of threat inflation in cyber security, see Myriam Dunn Cavelty, 
Cyber-Security and Threat Politics: US Efforts to Secure the Information Age (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2008); Jerry Brito and Tate Watkins, “Loving the Cyber Bomb? The Dangers 
of Threat Inflation in Cybersecurity Policy,” Harvard National Security Journal 3, no. 1 
(April 2011): 39–84; Sean Lawson, Beyond Cyber-Doom: Cyberattack Scenarios and the 
Evidence of History, Working paper (Fairfax, VA: Mercatus Center, January 2011); Gary 
McGraw and Nathaniel Fick, “Separating Threat from the Hype: What Washington Needs 
to Know About Cyber Security,” in America’s Cyber Future: Security and Prosperity in 
the Information Age: Volume II, ed. Kristin M. Lord and Travis Sharp (Washington, D.C.: 
Center for a New American Security, 2011), 43–53, 
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Cyber_Volume%20II_2.pdf; 
Erik Gartzke, The Myth of Cyberwar, Working paper, December 7, 2012; Diego Rafael 
Canabarro and Thiago Borne, Reflections on The Fog of (Cyber)War, NCDG Policy 
Working Paper (Amherst, Massachusetts, March 1, 2013). 
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For quite some time policymakers, and some analysts, have warned of 
a potential “Cyber Pearl Harbor” or “Cyber 9/11.”34 Andrew F. Krep-
inevich has described the former as involving some sort of complex 
cyber attack, possibly against critical infrastructure, which “would 
likely generate a similar sense of shock [as the attack on Pearl Har-
bor]. However, just as the attack on Pearl Harbor did not inflict a deci-
sive blow to the United States, neither is a surprise massive cyber at-
tack likely to do so.”35 Others have gone even further in ascribing de-
structive qualities to cyber weapons. In his confirmation hearing, Sec-
retary of State John F. Kerry called the challenges associated with 
cyber security “the 21st century nuclear weapons equivalent,” while 
former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta in 2012 warned that a series 
of cyber attacks aimed at the national critical infrastructure “would 
paralyze and shock the nation and create a new, profound sense of 
vulnerability.”36 This imagery is used to underscore the significant 
challenges and potential threats associated with cyber security. In a 
much-cited 2010 Foreign Affairs article, former Deputy Secretary of 
Defense William J. Lynn III laid out the challenges the US military 
faces related to cyberspace, including the dominance of offensive war-
fare, a lack of credible deterrence and extensive vulnerabilities.37 This 
all adds up to a high level of uncertainty, as regards both the threats 
and their potential effects. 
 
Related to this, policymakers, analyst and the media also use the term 
cyberwar quite liberally.38 This term is frequently used as a catch-all 
for all kinds of extensive cyber operations and conflict, ranging from 
organized cyber-espionage to attacks against critical national infra-
structure (CNI). It is not applied in the way Arquilla and Ronfeldt use 
it to describe a form of warfare; nor is it used to describe a stand-alone 
conflict in cyberspace, as a narrow definition of the term would sug-
gest. It is used to refer to an ongoing cyber conflict, but with more 
vivid and urgent language.  
' 
                                                 
34  Leon E. Panetta, “Defending the Nation from Cyber Attack” (presented at the Business 
Executives for National Security, New York, NY, 2012), 
http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1728; Richard A. Clarke and 
Robert K. Knake, Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do 
About It (New York, NY: Ecco, 2010). 
35  Krepinevich, Cyber Warfare: A “Nuclear Option”?, iii. 
36  John F. Kerry, Nomination: U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Washington, 
D.C., 2013); Panetta, “Defending the Nation from Cyber Attack.” 
37  William J. Lynn III, “Defending a New Domain,” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 5 (October 
2010): 97–108. 
38  Arquilla and Ronfeldt, “Cyberwar Is Coming!”; Clarke and Knake, Cyber War: The Next 
Threat to National Security and What to Do About It; Mike McConnell, “Mike 
McConnell on How to Win the Cyber-war We’re Losing,” Washington Post, February 28, 
2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/02/25/AR2010022502493.html; John D. Sutter, “Anonymous 
Declares ‘Cyberwar’ on Israel,” CNN.com, November 20, 2012, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2012/11/19/tech/web/cyber-attack-israel-anonymous/index.html. 
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While the policymakers and analysts who use these terms rarely refer 
explicitly to texts from the Revolutionist school, their ideas seem 
strongly influenced by this school’s expansive view, and particularly 
SIW. They share the Revolutionist idea that society is growing in-
creasingly dependent on ICT and thus vulnerable to disruption. Fur-
thermore, they hold that the allegedly low costs of entry into cyber-
space mean that more states and non-state actors are capable of com-
mitting malicious actions in cyberspace as opposed to in the tradition-
al domains of military power. 39 However, by failing to take into ac-
count the caveats on cyber power noted by Arquilla and Ronfeldt and 
others, these policymakers and analysts leave themselves open to crit-
icism. 
                                                 
39  The US national security apparatus has warned that an increasing number of actors, in-
cluding non-state ones, are capable of launching attacks in cyberspace. See U.S. Depart-
ment of Homeland Security, “The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace,” February 
2003; “Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace” (U.S. Department 
of Defense, July 2011), http://www.defense.gov/news/d20110714cyber.pdf; U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century De-
fense,” January 2012; Keith B. Alexander (Commander of United States Cyber Com-
mand), Oversight: U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Cyber Command (Washington, DC, 
2013). 
The Traditionalists 
It might seem that the “revolutionists” have successfully defined the 
debate over cyber security. However, there is a strong and growing 
opposition to the expansive view of cyber security.40 This trend can 
best be described as the “traditionalist” school of cyber security. The 
name does not imply backwardness or rejection of changing circum-
stances, but a reluctance to discard existing concepts, doctrines and 
policies prematurely. This school is fundamentally defined by its 
skepticism concerning the effects of the information revolution on in-
ternational security and relations, but should also be understood as a 
direct reaction to the ideas put forth by revolutionists, or more precise-
ly, their alarmist offshoots. Most of the traditionalist literature has 
emerged in recent years as the public debate over cyber security and 
policy has gained momentum, but critical texts date further back. 
 
An early example of scholarly work critical to “revolutionist” thinking 
on cyber security is Martin C. Libicki’s What is Information Warfare? 
from 1995. Libicki tackles the issue of information warfare head-on, 
dismantling and examining the various components of the concept. 
His work can give clarity to our discussion, and offers the closest 
thing we have to an authoritative and succinct definition of the core 
concepts discussed in this paper. “Information warfare, as a separate 
technique of waging war, does not exist,” he writes, adding: “[t]here 
are, instead, several distinct forms of information warfare, each laying 
claim to the larger concept.”41 One of these forms is cyber warfare, 
while some of the other forms show how ICT can assist other, more 
traditional military or covert operations.42 For instance, ICT can im-
                                                 
40  For examples of traditionalist writing, see Martin C. Libicki, What Is Information War-
fare? (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1995); Berkowitz, The New Face 
of War: How War Will Be Fought in the 21st Century; David J. Lonsdale, The Nature of 
War in the Information Age: Clausewitzian Future (New York: Frank Cass, 2004); Doro-
thy E. Denning, “Barriers to Entry: Are They Lower for Cyber Warfare?,” IO Journal 1, 
no. 1 (2009); Jean-Loup Samaan, “Cyber Command: The Rift in US Military Cyber-
Strategy,” The RUSI Journal 155, no. 6 (2010): 16–21; Brito and Watkins, “Loving the 
Cyber Bomb? The Dangers of Threat Inflation in Cybersecurity Policy”; Lawson, Beyond 
Cyber-Doom: Cyberattack Scenarios and the Evidence of History; Gartzke, The Myth of 
Cyberwar; Martin C. Libicki, “Cyberspace Is Not a War-Fighting Domain,” I/S: A Jour-
nal of Law and Policy for the Information Age 8, no. 2 (2012): 321–336; Rid, “Cyber War 
Will Not Take Place”; Thomas Rid and Peter McBurney, “Cyber-Weapons,” RUSI Jour-
nal 157, no. 1 (2012): 6–13; Canabarro and Borne, Reflections on The Fog of 
(Cyber)War. 
41  Martin C. Libicki, What is information warfare? (Washington, D.C.: National Defense 
University, 1995), x. 
42  The seven forms are: command-and-control warfare (C2W), which aims to strike at the 
opponent’s figurative head and neck; intelligence-based warfare (IBW), which occurs 
when intelligence is fed directly into operations, targeting, and battle-damage assessment; 
electronic warfare (EW), which includes the use of EMPs, jammers, and cryptography 
aimed at radar and communications systems; psychological warfare, which can be di-
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prove intelligence-based warfare by enabling greater collection of in-
formation and better facilitation of communications; while electronic 
warfare has been gaining more prominence not because of cyber tools, 
but because the greater use of ICT means a greater range of possible 
targets. 
 
Of all the forms listed by Libicki, only economic information warfare 
and cyber warfare can be deemed new concepts, although Libicki 
questions the utility of both. Economic information warfare would be 
a form of information blockade or information imperialism, but the 
concept is both unproven and conceptually hard to imagine working. 
Cyber warfare is the most relevant for this discussion, but also the 
most problematic, according to Libicki. It is “clearly the least tractable 
because by far the most fictitious, differing only in degree from in-
formation warfare as a whole.”43 Under the broad rubric of cyber war-
fare, there are four categories of attacks: information terrorism, se-
mantic attacks, simula warfare and Gibson warfare. Terrorism needs 
no further discussion at this point. Semantic attacks mean systemati-
cally planting false information in another network. Simula warfare 
simply means simulated conflict on a computer network to determine 
the outcome of a conflict without actual conflict. As Libicki notes, this 
is akin to laser tag or war gaming44 —a marginal issue at best. It is the 
fourth category that is most applicable to this discussion. The term 
“Gibson warfare” is a reference to William Gibson’s Neuromancer, 45 
which introduced the term “cyberspace.” As to why he brings up Gib-
son’s novel, and the Disney movie TRON, Libicki explains: 
 
Because to judge what otherwise sober analysts choose to include as information 
warfare—such as hacker warfare or esoteric versions of psychological warfare—
the range of what can be included in its definition is hardly limited by reality.46 
 
Libicki concedes that the scenarios of science fiction are possible, but 
will not be relevant for national security anytime soon. This is the 
crux of the traditionalist argument: while the theoretical potential for 
cyber warfare, and specifically SIW, exists, it is improbable at present 
and unlikely in the future. Libicki’s skepticism is grounded in two as-
sertions, one of concept and one of empirics. The former concerns im-
agination, though grounded in reality, which is stretched considerably 
to discuss the prospects of such warfare. The latter is simply a lack of 
empirical data showing the capability to conduct such warfare, or at 
least show a somewhat reasonable hypothetical scenario for that to 
                                                 
rected at the national will, opposing commanders, opposing troops, or in a cultural con-
flict; hacker warfare, which includes network attacks against civilian targets, but not mili-
tary ones; economic information warfare, like information blockade and information im-
perialism; and lastly, cyber warfare. 
43  Ibid, 75. 
44  Ibid, 81. 
45  William Gibson, Neuromancer (New York, NY: Ace Books, 1984). 
46  Libicki, What Is Information Warfare?, 81–82. 
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happen anytime soon. There have been obvious changes to cyberspace 
in the intervening years since Libicki’s book appeared, but the ques-
tion is whether our empirical foundations have changed to such an ex-
tent that we can imagine plausible scenarios of cyber warfare. In re-
cent years other scholars have picked up Libicki’s mantle and sought 
to critique revolutionist thinking with a better empirical grounding. 
Taking the “strategic” out of SIW 
The fundamental idea behind SIW is that actions taken through cyber-
space can have some stand-alone, strategic effect, and may, at the final 
extreme, constrain conflict to cyberspace alone. Several traditionalists 
have criticized this particular idea. Erik Gartzke has argued that cyber-
attacks’ lack of physical effects and the inability to conquer ground in 
cyberspace mean that threats of cyber attacks would not be particular-
ly effective in deterring or compelling an opponent.47 As such, cyber-
space does not have much stand-alone value. The introduction of 
cyber conflict entails not a narrowing of conflict, but rather a “broad-
ening of the dimensions of warfare.”48 
 
Jean-Loup Samaan has taken an even more reductionist view. He ar-
gues that cyber attack should be considered a subset of offensive op-
erations, “a means of denial rather than a means of punishment,” thus 
integrating it into a joint analysis of warfare in general.49 The basis of 
this conclusion is his analysis of the cyber domain. Samaan implicitly 
rejects the idea of SIW. In his view, analogies to nuclear warfare and 
strategic bombing inevitably fall apart. Cyber attacks cannot be com-
pared to nuclear attacks: the former “do[es] not have any direct lethal 
effect,” while the latter “remain[s] the single most destructive asset 
available.” His criticism of the comparison to strategic bombing is 
perhaps more contentious. Cyber attacks “could resemble air strikes in 
terms of disruptive effects,” Samaan writes, but he adds: “there is little 
evidence that strategic bombing has ever decisively determined victo-
ry.”50 Thus, by logic, the limited coercive power of strategic bombing 
translates to the cyber domain.51 This limitation also extends to how 
people respond to attacks. As Sean Lawson notes, history has shown 
that “both infrastructures and societies are more resilient than often 
assumed by policy makers.”52 The implication is that even if an actor 
were able to launch a large-scale attack, it is questionable whether that 
                                                 
47  Gartzke, The Myth of Cyberwar, 30. 
48  Ibid. 
49  Samaan, “Cyber Command: The Rift in US Military Cyber-Strategy,” 16. 
50  Ibid., 19. 
51 Samaan refers to the works of Robert Pape and Barry D. Watts as representatives of the 
arguments against and for the utility of strategic bombing and coercion. See: Robert Pape, 
Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1996); Barry D. Watts, “Ignoring Reality: Problems of Theory and Evidence in Security 
Studies,” Security Studies 7, no. 2 (1997): 115–171. 
52  Lawson, Beyond Cyber-Doom: Cyberattack Scenarios and the Evidence of History, 12. 
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would result in concessions or modified behavior as intended by the 
attacker. 
 
Given that cyber warfare does not hold much value as a separate form 
of warfare, Samaan argues that electronic warfare might serve as a 
better model: “It may be less strategic and more technical, but it is al-
so more relevant.”53 Libicki has made a similar point by arguing that 
cyberspace is not a war-fighting domain, but rather a technological 
function.54 Both arguments are interesting, but do not satisfy our in-
tention of examining the actual utility of cyber warfare. Electronic 
warfare is relevant in a functional sense, as both seek to disrupt infor-
mation systems, but there are two major caveats to this: (1) cyber war-
fare is defined more broadly than being simply disruptive, as it in-
cludes the ability to degrade and destroy systems; and (2) cyberspace 
encompasses much more than military communications systems and 
radars. Given these caveats, Samaan’s article serves as more of a cri-
tique of current understanding than as a full-fledged alternative model. 
 
In addition to raising doubts about the effects of cyber-attacks, tradi-
tionalists have also criticized the view that the barrier to entry is much 
lower in cyberspace than in other domains of warfare. While it is 
cheaper to buy computers and develop malware than investing in tra-
ditional military capabilities like bombers and naval warships, the di-
chotomy is not quite that simple, according to some scholars. Dorothy 
E. Denning argues that while the threshold for conducting low-level 
cyber warfare such as DDoS and webpage defacement is low, it is 
doubtful that CNA can have the equivalent effect of kinetic attacks at 
a lower cost:55 
 
the effects of cyber-attacks are relatively minor compared to what is achieved 
with armed forces, especially military operations that lead to the overthrow of 
governments, seizure of land, and human casualties. The discrepancy may nar-
row with more sophisticated cyber attacks that affect physical systems, but such 
attacks are likely to also have higher costs, raising the barriers to entry.56  
 
It should be noted that the barrier is not defined solely by one’s ability 
to code effective software. As Thomas Rid and Peter McBurney point 
out, “developing and deploying potentially destructive cyber-weapons 
against hardened targets will require significant resources, hard-to-get 
and highly specific target intelligence, and time to prepare, launch and 
execute an attack.”57 This distinction between simple attacks and 
complex attacks is often lost in the discourse, but helps to further il-
                                                 
53  Samaan, “Cyber Command: The Rift in US Military Cyber-Strategy,” 20. 
54  Libicki, “Cyberspace Is Not a War-Fighting Domain.” 
55  Denning, “Barriers to Entry: Are They Lower for Cyber Warfare?”. 
56  Ibid., 10. 
57  Rid and McBurney, “Cyber-Weapons,” 11. 
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lustrate the fact that CNO are defined by their targets, particularly 
their vulnerabilities and context. 
Defining war and warfare 
Beyond the empirical and conceptual problems discussed above, 
scholars in the “traditionalist” camp have criticized what they see as 
flaws in the theory foundation of the “revolutionist” perspective on 
cyberspace. The focal point of the discussion is defining war and dis-
tinguishing it from warfare—though the traditionalists’ criticism cuts 
much deeper and goes to the core of some revolutionist ideas. Using 
Clausewitz’ writings as a basis, we may say that war is a continuation 
of politics, a form of political violence, intended to compel the oppo-
nent to surrender or offer concessions, whereas warfare is the set of 
techniques used to wage war.58 In the context of cyber security, this 
well-established definition and distinction has become muddied by 
lack of conceptual clarity. This problem frequently emerges in the dis-
course on cyber security. The conflation of CNA and CNE is an oft-
repeated mistake, while a poor understanding of the mechanics of cy-
berspace has led policymakers to underestimate the difficulty and 
overestimate the probability of catastrophic cyber attacks. Both of 
these phenomena are emblematic of a conflation of cyberwar and 
cyber warfare, confusing ways and means with ends. The source of 
this confusion is beyond the scope of this paper, but it seems probable 
that the imaginative potential of cyber-attacks has blurred the distinc-
tion between war and warfare by keeping the focus predominantly on 
the technical aspects of cyberspace and ignoring the political context 
necessary for cyber conflict to occur.59 As with all other forms of war-
fare, large-scale CNA operations must serve a political purpose in or-
der to be considered war.  
 
A central text in this discussion, and a central part of the traditionalist 
school, is a 2011 article by Thomas Rid titled “Cyber War Will Not 
Take Place.” By applying Clausewitz’s principles of war to the con-
cept of cyberwar, Rid outlines three criteria for war: (1) all war is vio-
lence or potential violence, used to compel your enemy to do your 
will; (2) an act of war is instrumental, meaning there has to be an end 
to the war, and not just war for war’s sake; (3) and an act of war is al-
ways political. With regard to cyber security, he makes an important 
distinction: whereas traditional acts of war are “usually rather compact 
                                                 
58  The implication of using Clausewitz is that it gives cyberwar a political context and ob-
jectives beyond the disruption or destruction of computer networks. 
59  This phenomenon of an overly technocratic approach to security is similar to what Russell 
Weigley has referred to as “the American way of war.” As opposed to coercing the oppo-
nent to give you what you want through the diplomacy of violence, “the main kind of 
American strategy…remained the strategy of brute force…” See: Russell Frank Weigley, 
The American way of war: a history of United States military strategy and policy (Indian-
apolis, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1977), 475. 
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and dense,” cyberwar can be “a far more complex and mediated se-
quence of causes and consequences that ultimately result in violence 
and casualties.”60 Referring to the scant empirical data available on 
cyber warfare, Rid argues that the events we have seen do not consti-
tute cyberwar: first, the cyber attacks to date have had no possibility 
of causing physical violence, and therefore do not meet the criteria of 
violence; second, because of the difficulty attributing actions to actors, 
the instrumental aspect of the action cannot be proven; and third, 
much of what has occurred in terms of malicious actions in cyber-
space have been criminal acts with no clear political motivation. 
 
Rid uses a narrow definition of the use of force, restricting it to physi-
cal violence. This is in line with traditionalist thinking of war that 
holds that the introduction of technology does not fundamentally alter 
the nature of war. The nature of war is violent struggle, and this re-
mains constant.  As Clausewitz wrote:  
 
Now, philanthropists may easily imagine there is a skilful method of disarming 
and overcoming an enemy without great bloodshed, and that this is the proper 
tendency of the Art of War. However plausible this may appear, still it is an error 
which must be extirpated; for in such dangerous things as War, the errors which 
proceed from a spirit of benevolence are the worst.61  
 
Phillip S. Meilinger argues that this view is mistaken. While certain 
military historians and generals, inspired by Clausewitzian thinking, 
believe that the nature of war is immutable, Meilinger contends, 
“[they] most seriously err in equating land warfare—specifically, con-
ventional battle as once practiced—with war. This error reflects insti-
tutional bias and downplays the role of technology.62  
 
According to Meilinger, naval blockades are evidence that technology 
can change war and make it less bloody: 
 
The nature of war is mutable. Warfare in the modern world remains deadly and 
destructive, but it need not be violent or bloody. The fundamental aspect of war 
in centuries past may have taken the form of sanguinary battles between infan-
trymen, but that is no longer necessarily the case. Traditional sea warfare, as well 
as present- day cyber operations, can become enormously deadly and destruc-
tive—but neither violent nor bloody.63 
 
Meilinger has an important point, but he confuses two concepts: the 
nature and the character of war. The former is permanent, while the 
latter is ever-changing. As Colin S. Gray writes, the tools of warf-
                                                 
60  Rid, “Cyber War Will Not Take Place,” 8–9. 
61  Carl von Clausewitz, On War, eBook Collection (Web: Project Gutenberg, 2006), bk. 1, 
chapt. 1, sect. 3, par. 1, http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1946. 
62  Meilinger, “The Mutable Nature of War,” 26. 
63  Ibid., 28. 
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ighting are a secondary matter of detail.64 What matters is that cyber 
tools are used in a political context to achieve strategic goals. This is 
what is meant by the permanent nature of war: it inevitably means us-
ing power to impose your will on an opponent. It does not have to in-
volve actual bloodshed, although that is how it has been done histori-
cally. It is worth quoting at length why Gray holds that cyber conflict 
qualifies as cyberwar: 
 
The answer is twofold. First, war is conducted to serve policy and a political vi-
sion that inspires policy, and policy has many instruments with which 'to impose 
our will on the enemy'. Cyberwar, in the particular sense of strategic, stand-
alone, information warfare operations, can be seen as a reasonably distinct tool 
of grand strategy. A country may wage economic warfare also without using 
force. Coercion can take many forms. Second, cyberwar generally will be a team 
player to provide more or less direct support for the sharp end of the spear. Even 
if cyber combat has some stand-alone qualities, still it must occur in the political 
and strategic context of warfare. In other words, provided we are intelligent in 
thinking about new military instruments according to their unique natures, a tra-
ditional definition of war will not trouble us. Cyber power, and indeed space 
power in its current, though not future, form, cannot itself apply organized vio-
lence, or force. But so what?65 (emphasis added) 
 
Gray’s definition of cyberwar is distinct from Rid’s in one important 
aspect. While Rid sees the use of force in war as violent, instrumental, 
and political, Gray clearly states that violence is not necessary to con-
stitute an act of force. “Coercion can take many forms,” he writes. 
Fulfilling the other two criteria is hardly impossible, but Rid’s article, 
and the cyberwar debate writ large, is largely about semantics. 66 The 
debate has been colored by the rhetoric used by the policy community, 
which means that an explanatory approach to cyber conflict has been 
neglected. 
 
In the second half of his article, Rid makes an effort, by delineating 
the usefulness of cyber warfare, and thus attempting to explain the po-
litical and strategic utility of cyberspace. According to Rid, there are 
three forms of cyber warfare—sabotage, espionage, and subversion—
none of which amounts to more than “an auxiliary tool that is nice to 
have.”67 This is a reductive view. Though they may remain rare, de-
structive, or highly disruptive, CNAs are indeed possible, and might 
become more frequent as the vulnerabilities and knowledge of exploit-
ing those vulnerabilities increase. Rid seems to equate large-scale 
CNAs implicitly with cyberwar. In fact, it is possible to imagine cyber 
warfare  aimed at critical infrastructure or command and control sys-
tems without it escalating into cyberwar. Even still, beyond a certain 
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threshold, conflict in cyberspace is unlikely to remain “out there,” as 
states will resort to other military or political tools to defend them-
selves or to force compliance. Rid is therefore correct in claiming that 
cyberspace does not exist in a vacuum, but his assessment of what 
utility the environment holds is limited by the very small number of 
cases. Whereas “revolutionists” see possibilities without empirics, 
“traditionalists” tend to see only as far as the empirics go. This might 
suffice in other subfields, but cyber security is marked by rapid expan-
sion and uncertain change. 
 
Because of the fundamentally different beliefs about the information 
revolution and its impact on international security, the debate over the 
strategic utility of cyberspace is often framed as an either/or proposi-
tion. Either cyberspace represents a new way of warfare, with the po-
tential for SIW—or it is simply another tool in the toolbox. While this 
discussion is fruitful in forcing through conceptual clarity, it does not 
fully address the current use of cyberspace as an arena for conflict. 
Understanding the granular qualities of cyberspace will give a better 
idea of how cyberspace works today and is likely to work in the near 
future. To achieve this, we must turn to a different approach to cyber 
security, one often ignored in the larger debate. 
  
 
The Environmentalists 
There is a third school of cyber security, but it has not been as promi-
nent in the academic or policy debate. Whereas the revolutionist 
school is defined by what might be called technological optimism and 
the traditionalist school is defined by its skepticism regarding such 
expansive claims, this third school is defined by its conceptual and 
empirical approach. I will call this the environmental school of cyber 
security. The school is fragmented and not as complete as the others 
(largely because it has ambitions to be more systematic), so this sec-
tion will attempt to synthesize the various texts into a more coherent 
whole. Despite its flaws, this school offers better chances of develop-
ing a systematic framework of analysis for the strategic utility of cy-
berspace. What defines this approach is its focus on power in the con-
text of cyberspace.68 While we could call it the “power” school, the 
texts have a common analytical approach that describes it better: an 
environmental analysis of cyberspace. In essence, this means that the 
texts seek to define and measure the inherent characteristics or fea-
tures of cyberspace as a distinct environment, separate from other do-
mains and greater than the sum of its technological parts. This com-
prehensive approach offers the potential for a better understanding of 
cyberspace than the often parochial or speculative approaches of the 
two other schools. 
                                                 
68  For discussions on cyber power, see: Joseph S. Nye, The Future of Power (New York: 
PublicAffairs, 2011); Gregory J. Rattray, “An Environmental Approach to Understanding 
Cyberpower,” in Cyberpower and National Security, ed. Franklin D. Kramer, Stuart H. 
Starr, and Larry K. Wentz (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2009), 
253–274; David Betz, “Cyberpower and International Security,” Foreign Policy Research 
Institute, June 2012, http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2012/201206.betz.cyberpower-
international-security.html; John A. McCarthy, “Cyberpower and Critical Infrastructure 
Protection: A Critical Assessment of Federal Efforts,” in Cyberpower and National Secu-
rity, ed. Franklin D. Kramer, Stuart H. Starr, and Larry K Wentz (Washington, DC: Na-
tional Defense University Press, 2009), 543–556; Franklin D. Kramer, “Cyberpower and 
National Security: Policy Recommendations for a Strategic Framework,” in Cyberpower 
and National Security, ed. Franklin D. Kramer, Stuart H. Starr, and Larry K. Wentz 
(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2009), 3–23; Daniel T. Kuehl, 
“From Cyberspace to Cyberpower: Defining the Problem,” in Cyberpower and National 
Security, ed. Franklin D. Kramer, Stuart H. Starr, and Larry K. Wentz (Washington, DC: 
National Defense University Press, 2009), 24–42; Martin C. Libicki, “Military Cyber-
power,” in Cyberpower and National Security, ed. Franklin D. Kramer, Stuart H. Starr, 
and Larry K. Wentz (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2009), 275–
284; Stuart H. Star, “Toward a Preliminary Theory of Cyberpower,” in Cyberpower and 
National Security, ed. Franklin D. Kramer, Stuart H. Starr, and Larry K. Wentz (Washing-
ton, DC: National Defense University Press, 2009), 43–87. 
28 Hans-Inge Langø 
Cyberpower 
Before discussing the specifics of the environmental school, let us first 
define what is actually meant by cyberpower. Among the many defini-
tions, we may note that Joseph S. Nye, Jr. defines cyberpower as: 
 
[A] set of resources that relate to the creation, control, and communication of 
electronic and computer-based information—infrastructure, networks, software, 
human skills. This includes not only the Internet of networked computers, but al-
so Intranets, cellular technologies, and space-based communications. Defined 
behaviorally, cyberpower is the ability to obtain preferred outcomes through use 
of the electronically interconnected information resources of the cyberdomain. 
Cyberpower can be used to produce preferred outcomes within cyberspace, or it 
can use cyberinstruments to produce preferred outcomes in other domains out-
side cyberspace.69 
 
The first part of this definition specifies the “what” of cyberpower, 
while the second part defines the “how.” Here we are primarily inter-
ested in the latter. Nye gives a succinct definition of what cyberpower 
means, but it is not sufficiently detailed for our purposes. Let us turn 
to David J. Betz and Tim Stevens, who have delineated four types of 
cyberpower: compulsory, institutional, structural and productive.70 
Compulsory power is defined as “direct coercion by one cyberspace 
actor in an attempt to modify the behaviour and conditions of exist-
ence of another.”71 Institutional power means being able to exert in-
fluence and affect norms through intermediaries, in this case being 
international regulatory or governing bodies such as the Internet Cor-
poration for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and the Interna-
tional Telecommunication Union (ITU). 72 This is an indirect way of 
achieving political goals, but can help create a beneficial environment, 
even enhancing structural power by changing the structure of cyber-
space to the liking of the state in question. Structural power, as the 
name indicates, is based on the structural quality of cyberspace and 
how it created and distributes power. For instance, cyberspace may 
give oppressed populations in the Middle East and North Africa the 
opportunity to “network” through the Internet and empower them-
selves politically.73 Productive cyberpower as a form of power is more 
elusive. It refers to “the constitution of social subjects through dis-
course mediated by and enacted in cyberspace, which therefore de-
fines the ‘fields of possibility’ that constrain and facilitate social ac-
tion.”74 Given cyberspace’s ability to both “reproduce and reinforce 
existing discourses, as well as to construct and disseminate new ones,” 
                                                 
69  Nye, The Future of Power, 123. 
70  David J. Betz and Tim Stevens, Cyberspace and the State: Toward a Strategy for Cyber-
power (New York: Routledge, 2011), chap. 1. 
71  Ibid., 45. 
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73  Ibid., 48–50. 
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productive cyberpower is in many ways, according to Betz and Ste-
vens, “the foundation for other forms of cyber power.”75 
 
Together, these four types of cyberpower cover the various ways an 
actor can leverage cyberspace for political gains. In practical terms, 
compulsory power would mean the ability to attack or credibly threat-
en an opponent into making concessions or surrendering, and this 
would most likely be measured by an actor’s CNA capabilities and/or 
the opponent’s vulnerabilities. Institutional power would mean an ac-
tor’s ability to use IOs to gain influence, whereas structural power de-
fines whether the cyberspace environment is favorable to a particular 
actor, or not. Lastly, productive cyberpower would probably refer to 
the ability to create norms of behavior.  
 
Having defined and dismantled the term cyber power, let us move on 
to how scholars in the environmental school of cyber security have 
attempted to measure cyberpower. 
Comparitivists 
Roughly speaking, there are two environmentalist strains. The first of 
these has been discussed indirectly in the traditionalist section, but 
deserves a better introduction here. What we are referring to is the use 
of analogies, as criticized by Samaan earlier. This comparativist ap-
proach attempts to draw similarities between cyberpower, understood 
as a form of military power, and other forms. Here we note the evident 
similarities with SIW and revolutionist thinking; but the comparitivist 
approach is best described as an environmental approach, because it 
attempts to compare the inherent characteristics of cyber power vis-à-
vis other forms of military power. Those characteristics are derived 
from the properties of the cyberspace environment. In his seminal 
work on SIW, Rattray undertakes a comparative study of cyberspace 
and the rise of strategic air power in the 1930s, while other works 
have compared cyberpower to sea power and nuclear power.76 
 
The comparative approach is intended to offer something familiar 
when talking about something new, but this approach is not without 
pitfalls. Referring back to Samaan’s criticism, comparing cyberpower 
with some other power invariably means examining cyberpower 
through the lens of understanding of some other form of power. And 
so we get descriptions of cyberspace or its characteristics that are—at 
best—almost, but not quite, accurate. Instead of dissecting cyberspace 
by itself, we find ourselves grasping at commonalities that can be illu-
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sory or parochial (the latter being a particular danger, due to the small 
amount of cases). 
 
A clear example is the persistent comparison with strategic air power. 
Because cyber attacks can apparently be effectuated anywhere, with 
little or no warning, coupled with the focus on attacks against critical 
infrastructure, long-range bombers headed towards the enemy’s center 
of gravity in order to force a surrender may seem an appropriate anal-
ogy. However, such a comparison obscures the value and character of 
cyber attacks. Obviously, the kinetic potential involved is vastly dif-
ferent, but there are other differences as well. Bombs function largely 
independent of their targets. Fortification or underground facilities can 
prevent damage, but this can be remedied by scale. Cyber weapons, on 
the other hand, are defined by their targets and specifically their vul-
nerabilities. You cannot simply make the worm bigger: each piece of 
malware must be specifically designed for a certain target for it to be 
able to exploit an existing vulnerability, and only then can it have an 
effect. There are many other differences as well. Cyber weapons can 
have highly unpredictable effects, causing cascade effects throughout 
systems and across sectors. In that sense, they can be more like bio-
logical viruses than bombs—but that is a discussion for another time. 
Here my main point is that the comparitivist approach has perverse 
incentives, making it more appealing to look for commonalities than 
differences. 
Mapping the terrain 
Others have attempted to avoid this trap. The second strand of the en-
vironmentalist school is markedly different, as it approaches cyber-
space on its own terms. The characteristics of cyberspace are defined 
independently before any comparative study is undertaken (which is 
generally not necessary and is often perfunctory). The texts are not 
without flaws, but this still represents the most promising approach to 
the study of cyber security on a strategic level. It is well-suited for 
systematic studies of cyberspace as a strategic environment, and can 
better distinguish between the inherent nature of cyberspace and fluc-
tuating trends. Because this strand approaches cyberspace on its own 
terms, it also forces greater conceptual clarity—avoiding a conflation 
of terms and ideas. 
 
Not all the texts in this strand of the environmental school have taken 
a systematic approach to cyberspace, though they all offer some im-
portant insights. Nye’s work on cyberpower does not address its sub-
ject in a granular and comprehensive way, but offers a cogent discus-
sion of what he calls “power diffusion,” a consequence of the infor-
mation revolution. According to Nye, “two types of power shifts are 
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occurring in this century: power transition and power diffusion. Power 
transition from one dominant state to another is a familiar historical 
event, but power diffusion is a more novel process.”77 The latter is rel-
evant to our discussion, as the “information revolution is changing the 
nature of power and increasing its diffusion.”78 Nye maintains that 
states will remain the dominant actor, but will face increased competi-
tion from new actors, and difficulties in controlling society.79 
 
Similarly, the unique nature of cyberspace means some of the tradi-
tional concepts of international security and international relations 
theory do not translate well into the new environment. Martin Libicki 
has addressed the challenges of deterrence in cyberspace. Although 
not explicitly focusing on cyberpower, his analysis is based on an en-
vironmental analysis of cyberspace. Libicki questions whether “we” 
(the United States in his text) can hold the opponent’s assets at risk, 
and if so, can “we” do so repeatedly. Because of the imprecise nature 
of cyber weapons, successful retaliation is not assured, and unforeseen 
effects may run the risk of escalation.80 The second issue is the ability 
to strike repeatedly. Unlike nuclear deterrence, which is singular and 
symmetric, “[c]yber deterrence has to be repeatable because no feasi-
ble act of cyberretaliation is likely to eliminate the offending state, 
lead to the government’s overthrow, or even disarm the state.”81 
 
While these texts deal primarily with specific phenomena, Rattray has 
offered a more comprehensive framework of analysis. Picking up on 
his earlier work on SIW, Rattray wrote in 2009 of an environmental 
approach to understanding cyberspace and cyberpower. Examining 
existing theories of power (land, sea, air and space), he identified four 
common features: technological advances, speed and scope of opera-
tions, control of key features, and national mobilization.82 In techno-
logical advances, “[t]he rise of digital connectivity will have trans-
formative impacts,” but the increase in availability and anonymity 
creates new vulnerabilities to attack.83 Not surprisingly, the speed and 
scope of operations in cyberspace can increase with automation and 
increased connectedness, but this also benefits non-state actors.84 
When it comes to control of key features, cyberspace is reliant on 
physical infrastructure, but also governance. The latter comes in the 
shape of organizations like the Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (ICANN) and the International Telecommunica-
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tion Union (ITU), whereas the former means assuring the safety (and 
possibly the control) of choke-points like undersea fiber optic cables.85 
Here, Rattray makes reference to naval power theory, but it is unclear 
how any country would be able to defend such choke-points effective-
ly.86 Defending cyberspace would also require a form of national mo-
bilization. Rattray mentions several ways of achieving this, from har-
nessing the expertise of the private sector, where expertise mainly re-
sides, to a type of whole-of-nation approach encompassing economic, 
diplomatic and military power.87 
 
Rattray’s article is one of the most systematic analyses put to paper, 
but he commits one common error in discussing the strategic features 
or defining characteristics of cyberspace: he confuses the inherent 
qualities of cyberspace as an environment, with their security implica-
tions. This is a question of causality, as the former defines the latter. 
For instance, the attribution problem in cyberspace is not an inherent 
feature, but is the result of cyberspace’s malleability and decentralized 
nature. Any systematic framework of analysis of cyberspace should 
therefore begin with the inherent, if not permanent, features of cyber-
space itself, and from there draw existing or potential security impli-
cations. That would make it easier to see what is likely to be the per-
manent nature of cyber conflict and what is its mutable character.88 
 
The main strength of the environmental school of cyberspace is that it 
strives to provide better understanding of the environment itself, as a 
whole, and not only certain parochial or temporal issues stemming 
from it. Still, much work remains to be done. The comparativist strand 
offers some grounding in the familiar, but increases our understanding 
of cyberspace only indirectly, and often incorrectly. The second strand 
of the environmental school offers better potential for understanding 
cyberspace on its own terms. The works of Nye, Libicki and others on 
specific phenomena or characteristics do not provide a comprehensive 
look at cyberspace—but that does not mean these parts cannot be syn-
thesized into a greater framework, like that used by Rattray. While 
Libicki’s work deals explicitly with deterrence, his observations on 
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the limited effectiveness of cyber weapons, and thus threats, have im-
plications far beyond deterrence. They tell us something about the na-
ture of cyberspace, and should thus be part of any larger analysis.
Conclusions 
In recent years, revolutionist and traditionalist thinking on a select few 
issues has dominated the debate on cyber security. The possibilities of 
cyberwar and devastating attacks on critical national infrastructure 
have become perhaps the most common subjects of discussion—yet 
the sides often seem to be talking past each other, or with a flawed 
understanding of the issue at hand. That said, these two schools of 
thought in cyber security have contributed understanding to the strate-
gic utility of cyberspace. 
 
The revolutionist school of cyber security is marked by an inherent 
optimism: not optimism in the sense that technology can solve prob-
lems, but that it will change warfare and perhaps even war itself. 
Twenty years after John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt’s declaration 
that “Cyberwar is Coming,” there remains little evidence to justify 
their claim. This is partly an issue of semantics, but we are still wait-
ing for the full effects of the information revolution. Much of the 
revolutionist literature is best seen as concept development, and not 
empirically based research. Nonetheless, their concepts and ideas are 
forward-looking and delineate the possibilities of cyberpower. Simi-
larly, Strategic Information Warfare can serve as a warning against 
society’s increased dependence on information communication tech-
nology, even though this is a far cry from the types of attacks men-
tioned by the alarmists. 
 
The traditionalist school has served an important function as a correc-
tive against the more expansive claims of the revolutionists—though 
both make similar errors of inference. While the revolutionists con-
clude too much about the impact of ICT, traditionalists have restricted 
themselves to the very small number of cases, implicitly assuming that 
the situation is static.  
 
However, cyberspace is anything but static. Considered as an envi-
ronment, it is both diffuse and malleable—neither of which qualities 
enables easy analysis. The traditionalist position is thus perfectly un-
derstandable for trying to anchor something new to something old, 
but, as explained in this working paper, cyberspace must be under-
stood primarily on its own terms. 
 
The environmentalist school offers the potential for a more systematic, 
foundational framework of analysis. The comparitivist strand has lim-
ited utility, as it may lead to conceptual confusion, but the more com-
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prehensive strand sketched out by Gregory J. Rattray can provide a 
good start. Coupled with the more in-depth studies of scholars like 
Joseph Nye and Martin Libicki, as well as insights from computer sci-
ence studies, this approach can enable a more profound understanding 
of both cyberspace and its security implications. This is important be-
cause what might seem highly alarming today might prove to be a 
false alarm. Developments in cyber network defense may be able to 
render threats against critical infrastructure harmless, whereas new 
and unforeseen threats could emerge through cyberspace. Whatever 
transpires, this field of security is in flux, and it is imperative for the 
literature to reflect that fact. 
 
 
 
 
